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Summary
To foster comparison of policy interventions across the various categories of licit and illicit drugs, we develop a
typology of policies intended to address drug abuse problems. The principal dimensions of the typology are
policy type and intervention channel. While the typology has important limitations, as a mechanism to
organize information and stimulate thought it holds the potential to improve understanding of commonalities
and distinctions among policies applying to widely discrepant drug problems, both within and across cultures.
As such, it could contribute to the development of more effective approaches to grappling with a diverse set of
drug policy issues.
Introduction
Just as knowledge of biochemical and behavioral
dimensions of nicotine addiction can inform alcohol
research, understanding of tobacco and health policy
may offer lessons for both scholars and policy
makers interested in alcohol policy. More generally,
understanding policy dimensions of either of the
major licit substances of abuse might be expected to
inform researchers and policy makers concerned
with illicit drug abuse; the opposite relationship
could hold as well.
This paper develops a typology designed to
compare the nature and effects of policy interven-
tions across categories of licit and illicit drugs.
Comparison of specific policies across drugs clarifies
similarities and differences in policy interventions
by type of drug and facilitates a search for lessons
that cross barriers that now divide the communities
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of interest. The analysis builds on other typologies
concerning prevention activities (Ashley & Rankin,
1988; Holder & Wallack, 1986; Walsh & Gordon,
1986) and polydmg abuse (Wilkinson et al., 1987).
We begin with consideration of factors which may
justify policy intervention to deal with a perceived
drug problem. We then present our proposed drug
policy typology, illustrate its use, and consider its
limitations.
Rationale for governmental intervention
Policy formation is triggered by societal and institu-
tional perception of a problem for which a policy
response appears warranted (Kingdon, 1984; Cobb
& Elder, 1972; Merton & Nisbet, 1976). Given that
the practice of public policy varies significantly from
one period to the next, it is tempting to adopt a
simple empirical approach to defining the rationale
for government intervention: it is appropriate for
government to intervene when, with the consent of
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the governed, government determines it should
intervene (Steiner, 1974). Although lacking in
conceptual appeal (outside of a model of political
decision making), this answer at least offers the
virtues of simplicity and consistency.
Still, one senses that there ought to be distinct
reasons to justify an intervention. This recommends
a search for a conceptual model. In reviewing
discipline-based models of policy intervention, we
have derived a series of general principles that
stretch across disciplines and constitute a coherent
set of reasons for consideration of intervention. The
major weakness of these principles is that, in their
generality, they fail to draw sharp lines to determine
when each condition is or is not met.
The point of departure for our model is the
premise that well-informed adults should have the
right to engage in behaviors of their choosing so long
as their actions do not impose harms or costs on
others. Many leading theorists would reject this
premise, particularly those who define society in
communitarian rather than individualistic terms
(Beauchamp, 1975; Bellah, et al, 1985; Herzog,
1987; Walzer, 1983). We adopt it here because it
reflects what we interpret to be the dominant ethic
of contemporary Western society and it exerts
significant influence in Western policy legitimation
and fonnation. It should be noted, however, that the
absence of a more compelling theoretical rationale
may be a primary reason why drug-use policies are
so frequent., challenged in intellectual, legal, and
political arenas.
The rationale for considering intervention, given
our premise, includes four basic propositions and
two qualifications. Governmental intervention is
properly considered when any of the following
conditions exists:
(1) The consequence of drug use has significant
adverse implications for members of society
other than the individual drug user, including
destruction of property, reduced productivity,
increased taxes or health care costs, crime, etc.
(2) The drug user is a minor.
(3) The drug user does not possess sufficient
knowledge of the consequences of drug use to
make a rational decision on use of the sub-
stance.
(4) Society finds that the drug use in question is
simply unacceptable behavior, even though
none of the ingredients of the three preceding
propositions is present.
The first proposition is one which should receive
virtually unanimous assent in principle. The prob-
lem with it, as suggested above, is the difficulty of
determining when the implications for others are
significant enough to warrant intervention. Some
individuals are genuinely offended when others
chew gum, but in general (e.g. outside of elementary
schools), society does not currently view that as
sufficiently offensive to restrict the individual gum
chewer's use of the product. Note that this quality
can and does change over time; witness the case of
smoking in public places (US Department of Health
and Human Services, 1989).
The second proposition is far more straightfor-
ward. Western societies widely concur on the
appropriateness of regulating the behavior of mi-
nors, whether through compulsory education, re-
strictions on their involvement in the labor force, or
their access to licit drugs. This concurrence is based
on the assumption that minors are unable to protect
themselves and make mature, informed decisions
(Gaylin, 1982).
Much like the first proposition, the third one
suffers from the lack of specificity. How much
knowledge is 'sufficient'? How does a society
measure whether or not an individual possesses such
knowledge? Recent litigation in the United States
over cigarette producers' liability for smokers'
alleged lack of sufficient knowledge of the conse-
quences of smoking illustrates the enormous com-
plexities of addressing this proposition.
The fourth proposition falls perilously close to
the empirical model suggested above. Nevertheless,
its inclusion is essential, as it undoubtedly repre-
sents a major reason for governmental intervention.
It may be particularly useful in explaining policies
that are formulated to reflect changing public
opinion and social values by elected officials eager
to appear responsive to issues with high political
saliency (Price, 1978).
There are two significant qualifications to these
rationales for governmental intervention, although
each can be construed as covered by the four main
points. First, Donald Kennedy argues that govern-
ment
"has special obligations to those exposed to risk
wherever there is incentive to exploit (that is,
wherever benefits accrue to the persons who
generate the risk), and where there is a purposive
or commercial element in the addition of the risk"
(Kennedy, 1983, p. 51).
Clearly, these conditions apply to both licit and
illicit drug use, from the multi-billion dollar adver-
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tising blandishments of the cigarette and alcohol
producers to the street corner tactics of the heroin
pusher. We view them, however, as simply a
variation of our third proposition.
The second qualification is that intervention may
be warranted when the substance in question is
addictive. We say may be warranted because it is
possible to conceive of a knowledgeable, rational
adult choosing to adopt a behavior which he or she
knows to be addictive. We do not consider addiction
to constitute grounds for a wholly independent
rationale for intervention because the major ingredi-
ents are included in the four basic propositions,
namely adoption of the behavior as an adult and
possession of adequate knowledge of the addiction
potential and implications.
Realistically, lack of appreciation of addiction by
drug experimenters creates a special situation in
which addiction converts 'youthful indiscretion' into
a major adult problem. Surveys and simple common
sense strongly suggest that this characterizes most
cigarette smoking, much alcoholism, and much
dependence on the illicit drugs. (Bonaguro,
McLaughlin & Sussman, 1987; US Department of
Health and Human Services, 1988).
In outlining the four propositions, we have been
careful to describe them as circumstances under
which intervention may be considered, rather than
automatically undertaken. To convert consideration
into action, a contemplated intervention should
have to satisfy an additional criterion: it should have
to be sufficiently effective and efficient that the
'cure' would not be worse than the 'disease'
(Nadelmann, 1988; Wolf, 1988).
Policy typology
Having determined when governmental interven-
tion may be contemplated, we turn to the issue of
how government can intervene. Governmental in-
terventions range from the provision of information
to outright prohibitions on the possession or use of a
drug. In Fig. 1, which presents our drug policy
schema, three broad categories of intervention are
arrayed at the top of the matrix from left to right
according to their increasing degree of coerciveness:
information/education, economic incentives, and
regulation (statutes and rules).
While we believe that this classification schema
covers all relevant policy options (with the impor-
tant exception of the null option, i.e. doing nothing),
it must be emphasized that each of these three broad












































Figure 1. Drug policy typology.
options with varying degrees of coerciveness. The
information/education category, for example, in-
cludes everything from the least directive health
information presentation (e.g. the US Federal Trade
Commission's publication of the tar and nicotine
yields of cigarette brands) to formal education in
elementary and secondary schools. The category of
economic incentives includes excise taxation of licit
drugs, restrictions on producers' deduction of ad-
vertising expenses for tax purposes, mandatory
insurance coverage of drug treatment and rehabili-
tation, and so on. The regulatory category can range
from the relatively innocuous, such as the largely
ignored minimum purchase age for cigarettes, to the
most stringent of controls, such as felony penalties
for violating laws regarding the sale of narcotics.
Figure 1 includes a second dimension: the point
of intervention. Interventions can be applied di-
rectly to the end user of a drug, or they can operate
indirectly on the end-user through their effect on
the supply chain or other intermediaries, i.e. other
individuals or organizations, In each case, the effect
on the end user is of ultimate interest.
The point of intervention of a direct intervention
is the drug user or potential user. For example, a law
prohibiting possession of marijuana for private use
affects the user directly. Interventions that influ-
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ence the user through their application to some
other group are indirect. Within the category of
'other groups' are organizations that are part of the
drug supply chain—producers, wholesalers, retailers
—and other intermediaries, groups or systems that
are neither end users nor part of the supply chain,
such as the school system or restaurant owners.
As reflected in the structure of the typology,
indirect interventions often represent different pol-
icy types for the intervention channel and the end
user. To illustrate, the law prohibiting the posses-
sion of narcotics with the intent to sell is a formal
regulatory intervention from the perspective of the
parties immediately impacted by the law—drug
dealers—but from the perspective of the narcotics
user (or potential user) it represents an economic
intervention, because it drives up the price of the
drugs. A state law requiring public schools to
provide health education about alcohol and drugs is
a regulatory measure as perceived by the schools
(which are categorized as 'other intermediaries',
since they are neither end users nor part of the drug
supply chain). To the ultimate recipients of the
health education program, however, the interven-
tion is informational and educational.
Classification of prominent drug policies
The use of the typology is demonstrated by placing
a dozen major policies (Table 1) within the typology
cells and considering the policies' applicability to
each of four categories of drugs: the two principal
licit drugs, tobacco and alcohol, illicit drugs taken
together as a category (e.g. marijuana, heroin and
cocaine), and prescription drugs (as they are abused
by legitimate recipients of prescriptions; we con-
sider fraudulent acquisition of prescription drugs to
represent illicit drug use).
Table 1. Prominent drug control policies
1. Mandated education
2. Public service announcements
3. Product warning labels
4. Broadcast advertising ban
5. Supply interdiction
6. Excise taxation
7. Mandated insurance premium differentials
8. Possession ban
9. Restriction on use by place
10. Minimum age of purchase
U. Product composition regulation
12. Mandated workplace screening
These twelve policies appear in the drug policy
typology in Fig. 2. A line through a substance name
indicates that the specific policy is not feasible for
the specific drug typej brackets indicate a potential
but not currently existing policy for the relevant
drug type; otherwise there is an existing policy for
the identified drug category.
This selection of policies shows that prominent
policy options pertain to each of the drug types, for
each state of existence (i.e. existing policy, poten-
tial, infeasible), and for each of the three policy
types. In general, policies channeled to the end user
through an intermediary (supply chain or other)
reflect regulatory measures imposed on the interme-
diary.
Four of the cells are occupied by two policies. In
each instance, comparison of the two policies offers
insight worthy of generalization. The pairing of the
'mandated education' and 'broadcast advertising
ban' policies in cell 19 offers an obvious conclusion:
policies that seem related qualitatively often will fall
within the same cell of the matrix. These two
policies operate in opposite directions, the former
providing information, the latter withdrawing it. But
the shared objective is to increase the effectiveness
of the desired message, either by supplying more of
it or by restricting the availability of competing
messages.
The policy pairing in cell 11, involving the
interdiction of drug supply and excise taxation,
offers an intriguing lesson: policies that on their
surface appear to be unrelated may in fact share
much in common. The former applies to illegal
drugs, while the latter pertains to legal products. Yet
in both cases, the measure represents a regulatory
intervention imposed on the supply chain intended
to reduce drug consumption through an economic
incentive which operates on the end user. In both
cases, the net effect of successful policy implemen-
tation is to raise the price of the drug type and
thereby discourage consumption. Supply interdic-
tion appears here to be the analog for illicit drugs to
excise taxation of licit ones. In this context, the
effectiveness of supply interdiction can be inter-
preted in terms of its effect on street price and, in
turn, the effect of street price on consumption. The
first of these has been estimated recently (Reuter et
ai, 1988). The effect of street price on consumption
has not been studied thoroughly, but careful analysis
of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes and
alcoholic beverages (Cook & Tauchen, 1982; Lewit
& Coate, 1982) provides a model for consideration













































































Figure 2. Illustration of Application of Typology. Key: unmarked^existing policy, strike through ^infeasible,
brackets=potential policy
drugs. Similarities in response to price or cost for
the legal and illegal drugs of dependence have been
demonstrated in laboratory studies with both
humans and animal models (Griffiths et al., 1980).
The policy pairing in cell 3 combines the two
preceding conclusions. An outright ban on posses-
sion (policy 8) and restriction of use by place
(policy 9) sound similar in nature, yet each applies
uniquely, the former to illicit drugs and the latter to
licit drugs. Thus, there are policy types that are
qualitatively similar, even if they can only be
applied to one category of drug or the other.
The final policy pair, in cell 12 (minimum age of
ptirchase and regulation of product composition).
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offers an intriguing comparison of policies for the
licit drugs and the 'in between' category of prescrip-
tion drug abuse. We consider the latter 'in between'
licit and illicit because prescription drugs are not
available for unrestricted purchase, yet neither are
they illicit. Minimum age of purchase (policy 10) is
an existing policy for tobacco and alcohol and a
potential policy for prescription drugs. Conversely,
the regulation of product composition (policy 11)
applies currently to prescription drugs and remains
possible for tobacco and alcohol.
The fact that several cells, comprising three
entire rows, are blank does not mean that no
interventions are available. For example, education
programs for restaurant and bar owners concerning
their liability under 'dram shop' laws would fit into
cell 6 and the liability which is placed on the owner
would fall into cell 9. A sharp increase in the cost of
a liquor license might fall into cell 9 as well. Thus,
this brief examination of findings from the typology
must be considered simply illustrative of the
potential lessons that can emerge from use of the
typology.
Limitations of the typology
The first limitation is that use of the matrix is both
time- and place-dependent. While policies may
always fall within the same cell conceptually, the
state of application of the policies (existing, poten-
tial, infeasible) will depend on when the analysis is
occurring and where the jurisdiction for policy
implementation lies. Legally, some policies may be
feasible at one level of government but not at
another. For example, under current U.S. law, states
cannot regulate the labeling of cigarettes or content
of cigarette advertisements. Thus, the feasibility of
changing the Surgeon General's warning on ciga-
rette packs and advertisements differs for states
(infeasible) and the federal government (feasible).
With regard to time dependency, this distinction did
not exist prior to federal legislation in the 196O's.
Similarly, certain long-available policy types
becomes politically fashionable in different time
periods, viz. today's interest in legalization of illicit
drug use and military intervention to restrict drug
importation. Thus, there is a dynamic dimension to
use of the typology that is not captured in the static
format shown here.
A second limitation is really a qualification:
characterization of the policy-type dimension as
progressing from the least coercive category (infor-
mation/education) to the most coercive (regula-
tion) can mask differences in coerciveness that stray
from this rule of thumb. Clearly, there is consider-
able variation in the coerciveness of policies found
within any given cell. An example is the difference
between an excise tax often cents per bottle of beer
and a tax of $10,000 per ounce on the importation of
marijuana. While conceptually similar in one respect
(i.e. they are both product-specific taxes), they
reflect quite different policy objectives. Similarly,
the actual coercion associated with a specific
regulatory measure may fall dramatically short of
that associated with an economic incentive. A law
outlawing the sale of cigarettes to minors, if
unenforced and subject to no penalty, is signifi-
cantly less coercive than the aforementioned mariju-
ana tax (DiFranza et al., 1987).
The remaining limitations are more substantive.
As it now stands, the typology does not consider
whether alternative policies are politically accept-
able or institutionally implementable. Nor does it
consider the political and bureaucratic processes by
which policies are selected and implemented, or the
relationship between drug policy and other policy
areas on a national political agenda. Thus, we can
say very little about the intensification in the 198O's
of public and governmental concern over drug use
and related, policy options and the concomitant
legitimation of a range of policy options that would
have been deemed politically unthinkable in prior
decades.
For a variety of reasons, the typology is of limited
utility in assessing policy effectiveness. For any
individual measure, the matrix offers no insight into
inherent effectiveness potential. Beyond the inher-
ent potential, a variety of forces will infiuence the
extent to which that potential is approached. For
example, the discretion of the implementing agency
will influence effectiveness to varying degrees,
depending in pan on inherent characteristics of the
policy and of the law or regulation defining it. The
level of compliance with a policy will influene its
effectiveness; again, the matrix is silent on this
matter, both within cells and even within specific
policies. Finally, the nature and level of enforce-
ment may profoundly impact realized effectiveness
(Hardin, 1982; Hawkins, 1984; Russell et al, 1986).
Each of these factors could be included in the
typology matrix as an added dimension, but at the
price of introducing complexity that might obscure
the basic purpose of the typology.
One unanticipated 'finding' in Fig. 2 reflects
many of the typology's limitations and shows how
uncritical application of the typology can lead to
Drug policy typology 261
misinterpretation of the policy environment. For the
policies categorized in Fig. 2, three indicate that
tobacco policies exist while comparable alcohol
policies do not but could (i.e. they are 'potential');
none indicates the reverse (i.e. existing alcohol
policies but only potential tobacco policies). This
could leave the reader with the impression that there
is more (and perhaps implicitly better) policy
pertaining to tobacco than to alcohol in the United
States. Such an impression could be erroneous. The
failure of Fig. 2 to show this reflects, for example,
the fact that both tobacco and alcohol are recorded
as having existing minimum age of purchase laws
(policy 10). When one considers the nature and
extent of such laws and of their enforcement, one
recognizes there is a dramatic distinction between
minimum age laws in the cases of tobacco and
alcohol. Our typology does not capture such
distinctions.
Conclusion
As the preceding discussion suggests, the limitations
of this exercise in drug policy classification are
many. At the same time, the potential for use of the
matrix to generate insights into constructive ap-
proaches to drug policy development seems con-
siderable. The process of identifying and classifying
policies as they pertain to different types of drug
problems can broaden perspectives on options
available. Comparisons such as the supply interdic-
tion/excise taxation pairing in Fig. 2 (cell 11) hold
the potential of generating understanding of the
mechanisms by which policy interventions may
work, and of their possible effectiveness.
A significant strength of the policy matrix is its
potential to contribute to fruitful comparative
analysis at several levels, including comparisons
between the major licit drug problems, tobacco and
alcohol; between illicit drug issues (e.g. marijuana
and cocaine); and between the broad categories of
licit and illicit drugs. The typology lends itself
nicely to cross-cultural or cross-national compari-
sons, serving as a device to stimulate consideration
and analysis of different countries' approaches to
both similar and divergent drug problems.
As the discussion of limitations demonstrated,
this approach to classifying drug policies holds little
promise of offering definitive answers to pressing
social questions. Nevertheless, as a mechanism to
organize information and stimulate thought, it may
represent a device worthy of exploration and
development.
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